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Introduction
I analyse the market power-stability relationship in the context of the legal setting in which the bank operates. I examine whether the e↵ect of market power on bank risk-taking di↵ers, depending on an increase versus a decrease in creditor rights. I find that the e↵ect of market power on bank stability is significantly smaller when there is an increase in creditor rights, compared to the situation when there is a decrease in creditor rights. The policy implications are potentially large: in countries with poor creditor rights (such as the French civil law countries), policies reducing competition could be a fruitful channel for fostering stability in the banking sector. However, similar policies will be less e↵ective in countries with stronger creditor rights (such as the English common law countries).
In this paper, I explore how bank-level stability is a↵ected by changes in creditor rights and the interaction of creditor rights and bank market power. I
